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- The mother had wrongfully retained the son in England at the end of an agreed six-month visit, and then, after a court-ordered return to Ukraine, she had wrongfully removed him to England. In Hague Convention proceedings intended to secure his son's return, the father applied for disclosure of material generated during the child's successful application for asylum in England. This material, the father argued, formed the basis upon which he was being denied a remedy in the Convention proceedings. Prior to asylum being granted, orders had been made (and upheld) requiring the child's return. The question now was whether the court had locus or jurisdiction to take any further steps in the 1980 Convention proceedings or if they had come to an end by operation of law. Roberts J acknowledged the father's frustration at being unable to enforce the orders which he had secured, and the potential unfairness of an asylum process in which he had no right to see or challenge the evidence submitted. However, she dismissed the application for disclosure of the asylum file, describing it in part as little more than a fishing expedition into the prospects of a collateral challenge to the Secretary of State's decision. The child's Article 8 rights, those of his mother and the wider policy considerations underpinning the confidentiality of the asylum process tipped the scales firmly in favour of refusing disclosure. Different considerations might apply in proceedings under the Children Act 1989 or otherwise. The return orders would be set aside. Judgment, 08/10/2021, free
- The former wife appealed against an order consequent upon a financial remedies hearing which had occupied several days in November and December 2020, following which the judge had circulated a draft reserved judgment which itself generated a request for clarification, further email submissions and ultimately a slightly revised approved judgment. The three live grounds of appeal were that the judge had been wrong to make no provision for the wife’s liabilities, had failed to step back and cross-check his award to ensure fairness, and had wrongly imposed a s 28(1A) bar. The latter ground of appeal was dismissed: the actual order made was within the available discretionary outcomes, and justifiable on the evidence. However, in the view of HHJ Mark Rogers, the practical impact of the judge’s exclusion of the costs liability had been to reduce the capital available to the wife for housing by about 37%, contrary to his own assessment of her housing need. The judge’s approach to the calculation of the correct needs-based lump sum had been wrong in law. As to the cross-check, failure to carry one out was not strictly capable of being a ground of appeal, as it was the ultimate decision that was under review, but, in the view of HHJ Mark Rogers, the judge’s failure to do so was clear and illustrated his failure to engage with the true discretionary process. The appeal was allowed and the lump sum order of £475,000 was set aside. The matter was not remitted; HHJ Mark Rogers assessed the appropriate lump sum award at £600,000. He directed that the husband should pay the wife’s costs of the appeal, the quantum of which was determined in a summary assessment, at the joint request of the parties. Judgment, 31/08/2021, free
- The former husband appealed against an order committing him to prison for six weeks unless he paid the sum of £50,000 to his former wife, as previously ordered by Mostyn J, by way of maintenance. The order was made under s 5 of the Debtors Act 1869 and the judgment summons procedure in Order 28 of the County Court Rules 1984. Underhill LJ noted that a judgment debtor can only be committed if the creditor proves to the criminal standard that the debtor had the means to pay the sum in question at the relevant date, but had refused or neglected to do so. The former husband appealed on the ground that the judge could not have been satisfied beyond all reasonable doubt that he had the sum in question. Underhill LJ did not accept that submission. There was no rule that the only way in which the judge could be sure of that point was by explicit evidence given at the time of the committal hearing. What was required would depend on all the circumstances of the case, including such inferences as it was proper for the judge to draw from the evidence that he did hear, which might include an inference that unless there were some reason to believe to the contrary the original default was continuing. In the circumstances of the present case, the judge had been fully entitled to conclude to the criminal standard that the money was still outstanding. Nugee LJ agreed. The appeal had been lodged seven days out of time; the extension was allowed, and the appeal dismissed on the merits. Judgment, 23/08/2021, free
- The wife had previously sought to register and enforce the financial provisions of a 2010 French order through the English courts, but rather than applying under the Maintenance Regulation in the Family Court had made the application in the High Court. The mistake came to light in March 2020. An application for rectification had failed since there was insufficient evidence for the court to be satisfied that the husband was habitually resident or had assets in England, and previous orders for enforcement were declared null and void. The wife now appealed against this decision on the ground that the judge had erred in failing to find the conditions in FPR PD 34E para 4 to have been satisfied, but her appeal was dismissed by the Court of Appeal on the basis of the respondent's notice, which argued that the court had made an error of law in finding that FPR 4.1(6) was sufficiently wide to allow the relief sought by the wife. The wording of FPR 4.1(6) did not provide for rectification, only for variation or revocation. In King LJ's judgment, even if FPR 4.1(6) had been engaged and an order of variation made, the court could not possibly justify backdating the order to September 2017 when the evidence necessary for the making of the order had not been before the court at the time the original order was made. It was therefore unnecessary for the Court of Appeal to hear argument in relation to FPR PD 34E. Lewison LJ and Sir Nicholas Patten agreed. The appeal was dismissed. Judgment, 31/07/2021, free
- This was a second appeal in a financial remedy case described by the court as an exercise in self-destruction, the costs having become so disproportionate relative to the assets. The judge at first instance had made an order providing the husband with funds sufficient to buy a modest property and to pay most of his costs. The wife had appealed on the basis that the husband should not have been awarded anything at all and should bear his own costs. The appeal had been allowed, and the direct payment referable to the husband's costs had been substituted with a charge for the same sum to be secured on the property he would in due course purchase. The husband now appealed against the imposition of the charge. In King LJ's judgment, in cases where an order substantially in excess of the sum required to meet a party's assessed needs was sought in order to settle their outstanding costs (or debts referrable to costs), the judge should: (i) consider whether in any event the case was one in which an order for costs under FPR 28(6) and (7) in particular by reference to FPR PD 28 para 4.4 should be made; and (ii) have firmly in mind what the order they proposed to make by way of additional lump sum to meet a party's costs would represent if expressed in terms of an order for costs. This would act as a cross check of the fairness of the proposed order. In her view the order originally made by the judge, which allowed the parties to achieve a clean break, could not be regarded as being outside his wide discretion such that it was appropriate for his order to be altered on appeal. Moylan and Newey LJJ agreed. The appeal against the imposition of a charge on the property the husband hoped to buy was allowed. Judgment, 31/07/2021, free
- The father appealed, on the basis that he was incorrectly treated as a "non-resident" parent for the purposes of s 3(2) of the Child Support Act 1991, against a regular deduction order made under s 32A of the same act, in accordance with the Child Support (Collection and Enforcement) Regulations 1992 (SI 1992/1989), relating to alleged arrears of £2,519.86 that had allegedly arisen between 2007 and 2015. Despite repeated notices being sent to the Child Maintenance Service and, later, to the Secretary of State, there had been no response at all from the Service or from the Secretary of State. HHJ Wildblood QC accepted the father's evidence that the children had spent more time living with him during the relevant period; he had nothing from the respondents to contradict it or to explain their reasoning. On the basis of that unchallenged evidence before him, he accepted that the appeal had to be allowed for the reasons advanced by the father. He did so, and set aside the deduction order. An order for costs was made against the Secretary of State, and the sums already paid to the Service under the deduction order were to be repaid forthwith. The father asked the judge to publish the judgment to record the difficulties that he had encountered in securing a resolution of the issue. Judgment, 28/07/2021, free
- The parties had married in 1980, and divorce proceedings had concluded in 1991. The financial remedy proceedings had been enormously and bitterly contentious. The former wife now sought a wide range of orders against the former husband, including applications for: a freezing injunction under s 37 of the Senior Courts Act 1981; a non-molestation order under the Family Law Act 1996; an order for payment of outstanding arrears; an order for upward variation of spousal maintenance; an order for costs; and orders for various lump sums. In Cobb J's view, the presentation of the wife's case at the hearing had been somewhat chaotic, and her written evidence had contained unevidenced allegations and statements which strongly indicated a high level of paranoia and delusional thinking, including what were in his view extravagant claims of serious criminal conduct and acts of harassment. The application for a freezing order was doomed to failure given that the wife's purported claim for payment of arrears of periodical payments was itself hopeless. None of the issues canvassed in her evidence justified or called for a non-molestation order. Her applications were hopeless, unsupported by evidence, and without proper jurisdictional basis. Cobb J refused them all except for an application for upward variation of maintenance, which he would transfer to be heard at the appropriately located Family Court near to her home. Judgment, 09/07/2021, free
- The parties married in Pakistan in 1981, separated in 2006, and the husband obtained a divorce in Pakistan in 2012. He died in 2021. In 2017, the wife had been given leave to bring proceedings under Part III of the Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act 1984. The core question was whether the unadjudicated claim by the wife under Part III survived the death of the husband and could be continued against his estate. Mostyn J noted that the Part II jurisprudence unambiguously stated that a financial claim made during marriage or following divorce expired with the death of the respondent. In his judgment, this principle applied equally whether the claim proceeded under Part II following a domestic divorce or under Part III following an overseas divorce. Although he disagreed with the decision in Sugden v Sugden [1957] P 120, he was bound by it, and thus dismissed the wife's application, since her former husband had died before her claim for financial provision following the overseas divorce could be adjudicated. However, he was also satisfied that that there was a point of law of general public importance involved, and that this would be a proper case for the grant of leave to the Court of Appeal. If there were to be a leapfrog application to the Supreme Court then the dismissal of the wife's claim would be stayed, and all injunctions would stay in force until the application for leave had been heard. Judgment, 07/07/2021, free
- The parties married in 2004, separated in 2015 and the decree absolute of divorce was granted in 2019. The three children lived with the mother and had only indirect contact with the father. DJ Graham Keating found that their housing needs were being met, albeit imperfectly, by living in the former matrimonial home (FMH). He considered whether the income disparities and needs justified spousal maintenance. Although the mother had not been transparent about her resources, and the parties' litigation history strongly suggested that a clean break and the avoidance of subsequent litigation was very desirable, the mother would be responsible for the care of the children, for housing, feeding, schooling and clothing them. The district judge decided to grant the mother a 48.9% share of the father's 1995 pension, made no order for spousal maintenance, and left the beneficial interest of two properties with the mother and one with the father. He ordered the sale of the FMH, but this would not take effect provided that the mother secured the father's release from the mortgage, and paid him all costs awards from these proceedings, plus interest. If that were done within two years, the FMH need not be sold and the father would transfer his legal and beneficial interest in it to her. The father sought his costs of the FDR, and relied on a schedule of costs totalling £8,468. The district judge ordered that the mother should pay £7,388. The father also claimed for costs for the remainder of the proceedings. The district judge, quoting Mostyn J in OG v AG [2020] EWFC 52 ("if, once the financial landscape is clear, you do not openly negotiate reasonably, then you will likely suffer a penalty in costs") found that each of the factors in FPR 28.3(7)(a), (b), (d) and (e) justified an award of costs in favour of the father, the mother's evidence having been "elusive and evasive" as to her income. The mother was ordered to pay £9,000 towards the father's costs since the FDR. Judgment, 04/07/2021, free
- The latest release of statistics on the Child Maintenance Service for Great Britain between January 2015 and March 2021. News, 30/06/2021, free