- A fact-finding exercise within an application for a child arrangements order with regard to the younger of two half-brothers. The only evidence had been from the parents. The mother had accused the father of grabbing her by the threat, punching her, and emotionally abusive and controlling behaviour. In HHJ Robin Tolson QC's view, "the individual allegations of domestic violence in the Schedule advanced by the mother against the father were insignificant in themselves", and unlikely to affect child arrangements. It was also, he said, "necessary to factor in the effects of a system which encourages allegations of domestic abuse", as well as the mother's mental health issues. On the morning of the trial, the mother had added an allegation of rape. HHJ Robin Tolson QC found that everything turned on the credibility of the witnesses, and none of the allegations were proven beyond limited admissions made by the father. Those admissions did mean, however, that the mother was "a victim of domestic abuse". He decided that a guardian should be appointed for the child, and a direction was made for the relevant local authority to undertake an investigation of both children to determine whether public law proceedings should be issued. By consent, he directed a psychiatric assessment of the mother. He also made an order for the child to spend time with his father, supervised by an independent social worker, once the international quarantine rules permitted it. Judgment, 12/04/2021, free
- The issue to determine was how much the four-year-old daughter should see of her father. The mother had alleged domestic abuse and rape. HHJ Tolson QC said it might be thought that the allegations "could have been safely consigned to the past", given that "at the time of the first allegation the mother was not even pregnant with [the daughter]" but in "the era in which we now operate … such allegations are invariably taken very seriously". He invited "both parents and everyone involved in the case to recall that all we are about is establishing, if possible, a good relationship between a little girl and her father" and the allegations of rape, which he described as "limited non-consensual sex", "would have, in my judgment, almost no implications at this stage for the future development of the relationship between the father and [the daughter]". He found that the mother's allegations of the first incident were "deeply unconvincing stuff", which meant that in his view he was "faced with a dishonest witness and it is a very long step indeed to my accepting the accuracy of her version of events" as to the second alleged incident. He reached the conclusion that the events did not happen, while the alleged "financial abuse and emotional abuse and harassment, have not been investigated during this trial" and had "no implications for the future child arrangements in the context of this case". His conclusion was that "there are no relevant findings which amount to any risk to the child or indeed any risk to the mother herself", and so the way was now clear "to develop the father's relationship with [the daughter] into one where there is a normal relationship between a separated father and his daughter". He provided for a further hearing, should agreement between the parties prove impossible. A later note stated that the parties had reached agreement and an order by consent had been made. Judgment, 06/04/2021, free
- The parties had married in 2011 but separated a year later, when the mother was pregnant with their child. The father appealed against findings of fact that he had (i) raped the mother twice whilst she was in bed with their young child, (ii) emotionally abused the mother, and (iii) threatened to abduct the child. The appeal focused on what was said to be the failure by the judge to consider the allegations in their totality. Criticism was made of her decision not to consider and weigh the evidence in respect of, or to balance in her decision-making, the evidence relating to a number of core allegations made by the respondent. Complaint was made that she had compartmentalised the evidence and that she had failed to consider properly the appellant's case that the allegations against him had been fabricated. Roberts J reached the conclusion that the judge's findings could not stand, not necessarily because she was wrong, but because of the manner in which she appeared to have reached those conclusions. The reasoning was insufficient to explain how the judge had conducted her assessment of credibility and which matters she had, or had not, weighed in the balance when reaching her conclusions. In a case where one party was alleging that allegations had been fabricated as part of a course of conduct designed to marginalise a parent from the life of a child of the family, it was incumbent on the fact-finder to explain carefully why that case was rejected. That had not happened in this case. The appellant had been left with the impression that his case had not received the careful consideration which it deserved. The appeal was allowed, the findings set aside, and the matter would be remitted for an early rehearing. Judgment, 05/04/2021, free
- The Court of Appeal (the President of the Family Division, King LJ and Holroyde LJ) was concerned with four appeals in ongoing Children Act 1989 proceedings involving allegations of domestic abuse by one parent against the other. The decisions on the appeals, the court explained, turned on long-established principles of fairness or the ordinary approach to judicial fact-finding, and none purported to establish new law, or to establish any legally binding precedent. However, the court noted, at least 40% of private law children cases now involved allegations of domestic abuse, about 22,000 cases each year, and so the court took the opportunity to give more general guidance about such matters, such as the proper approach to deciding whether a fact-finding hearing was necessary, and whether, where domestic abuse was alleged in proceedings affecting the welfare of children, the focus should in some cases be on a pattern of behaviour rather than specific incidents. It noted that there had been effective unanimity in submissions to the court that the value of Scott Schedules in domestic abuse cases had declined to the extent that they were now a potential barrier to fairness and good process, rather than an aid. Reducing the focus to a limited number of events created the risk of the court losing the vantage point needed to consider whether there had been an overall pattern of coercive and controlling behaviour. The appeals in Re B-B and Re T were allowed, and the matters remitted to different judges. The appeal in Re H-N was allowed and the matter was remitted to the Designated Family Judge at the Central Family Court for further case management. The appeal in Re H was dismissed. Judgment, 31/03/2021, free
- The daughter was four years old. In 2017 the mother had been ordered to return her to England from Poland. In 2019 she had been given temporary permission to take the girl back to Poland. The purpose of this hearing was to determine whether or not the preconditions for removal had been met so that the temporary relocation would be made permanent, and, if so, to consider the time she would spend with each parent, her future schooling, and the father's concern that the terms of the final order should not be susceptible to unmeritorious variation or challenge by the mother before the Polish courts. Williams J was satisfied that the application of the paramount welfare of the child and the welfare checklist led inevitably to the conclusion that she should make her life in the medium to long term in Poland, being cared for jointly by her mother and father. He granted the mother's application for leave permanently to remove the child from the jurisdiction to live in Poland, and made an order that the child would live with her mother and father in the city they had settled in. A specific issue order was made in regard to the child attending an international primary school. Judgment, 30/03/2021, free
- The father had sought an order for the American mother to return their 16-year-old daughter from the USA. A residence order had been made in his favour and he had been her primary carer for many years. The mother had arranged a plane ticket and American passport for the daughter without telling him. He had found out when the girl phoned him from the plane. The Hague Convention did not apply because of her age, so an application for wardship and return orders had been made under the inherent jurisdiction. Although the parties subsequently reached agreement, and now presented a consent order, Peel J considered it appropriate in this case to deliver a judgment, partly because jurisdictional issues arose and partly because he was of the clear view that it would assist the parties and their daughter to achieve a degree of closure. He concluded that the child had not acquired habitual residence in the USA at the relevant time, and he sympathised with the father's profound concern about the way in which the daughter had left the UK. However, the wishes of a nearly 17-year-old were likely to be determinative, absent powerful or compelling welfare interest to the contrary, and the daughter had quite simply decided that her future was in the USA. A return order would be an exercise in futility. Peel J granted the consent order sought. Judgment, 29/03/2021, free
- The Irish father sought the return of two five-year-old children to the Republic of Ireland under the Hague Convention. The mother, a British national currently living in England after a clandestine departure, opposed the application, while applying under the Children Act for leave to remove to Ireland in respect of her third child, in case a return order was made in respect of the other children. The father of the third child applied for a residence order and a prohibited steps order. Peel J made a return order for the first and second children upon their father undertaking, among other things, to pay weekly child maintenance and to not support any prosecution of the mother. Peel J also decided that the mother should be given permission to relocate with the third child to Ireland. Among other factors, the father of the third child had shown himself capable of violence to the mother and her children, and so the court could not be confident about entrusting the care of the third child to him. Judgment, 22/03/2021, free
- A fact-finding hearing to determine whether the courts of England and Wales had jurisdiction to determine welfare issues in relation to three children. The applicant was the mother of the three children, the respondent the father. Their precise history was disputed, but both parents had come to England as asylum seekers. The mother claimed to be from Yemen and the father claimed to be from Somalia, and they had three children. One was born in Sheffield, one in Yemen, and, after the family left the UK in 2008, the third was born in either Yemen or Saudi Arabia. Ms Sarah Morgan QC, sitting as a deputy High Court judge, came to the view that some of the evidence placed before her had been misleading and intended to mislead. The case had unusually difficult features, caused by the passage of time, and there was no agreement between the parties even as to that which she was being invited to consider and determine. She found that the family had left (and the mother had consented to the children's departure from) England and Wales in 2008 for the purposes of a holiday and not as a permanent relocation. Immediately before leaving, the family had been habitually resident in England and Wales. Neither before nor once they had left had the mother indicated consent to a relocation. Thus there had been a wrongful removal in that the mother had consented to a holiday but not to a relocation, and/or there had been a wrongful retention when the father failed to arrange their return to England and Wales at the conclusion of the holiday. She found that the court had jurisdiction in respect of the two older children, and although the third child had never lived in or even visited the United Kingdom, jurisdiction in respect of her existed by reason of the doctrine of Parens Patriae. The matter was listed for consequential directions in consultation with Williams J. Judgment, 20/03/2021, free
- An appeal from an order for the summary return of a three-year-old child to the USA. The mother was British and alleged an abusive relationship. The father was American and denied the allegations. The mother asserted that, after having found that her allegations were of a nature to engage Art 13(b) of the 1980 Hague Convention, the judge had been wrong to grant the father's application. She also issued an application asking the court to admit further evidence. Peter Jackson LJ found that the situation portrayed in letters from the mother's GP was markedly more severe than that previously described to the extent of being capable of influencing the outcome, and he would therefore admit the evidence. The judge had directed himself meticulously and he had methodically reviewed all the evidence that was before him. However, the appeal had to be determined in the light of the further evidence concerning the mother's mental health and family support, which showed an escalation in self-harming behaviour to the point where she could not currently live alone with the child in England, let alone elsewhere. Haddon-Cave and Elisabeth Laing LJJ agreed. The return order was set aside and the father's summons under the Convention was remitted for rehearing by the judge on an expedited basis. Judgment, 19/03/2021, free
- Two barristers had separated in January 2019. The husband wished an immediate order for sale of the family home to be made, to enable him to enforce his entitlement to £250,000 plus statutory interest. The wife hoped for a finding that the entire order approving a previous agreement should be set aside, with the effect of putting the case back to square one with all arguments re-opened. HHJ Edward Hess reached a clear view that the facts of this case did not pass the "setting aside" test from Walkden v Walkden [2010] 1 FLR 174: "given the importance attached to finality in settlements of this nature, the circumstances must be truly exceptional before a capital settlement can be re-opened". After considering the fairness of the parties' suggested scenarios, he decided in the end that making an order for sale, but delaying its implementation, would be the scenario most likely to give both parties some prospect of a reasonable financial future. Judgment, 18/03/2021, free
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