Family Law Hub

Marital Assets

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  • The husband appealed from the final financial remedy order. The issue at the heart of the appeal was whether the judge's determination of the £3.4m award he made in favour of the wife was flawed because it was based in part on a flawed figure for the parties' capital resources advanced on behalf of the wife. Moylan LJ came to the conclusion that the judge's decision was indeed flawed for that reason and had to be set aside. The figures that each side had put forward for the judge had been similarly flawed in their approach. He considered whether the Court of Appeal was able to substitute its own decision but he concluded that it could not. Popplewell and Phillips LJJ agreed, and the case was remitted to the same judge for rehearing. Judgment, 03/03/2021, free
  • The wife appealed from an order that had reduced the lump sum awarded to the husband from £814,000 to £733,650 (£630,000 and £550,000 net after payment of capital gains tax) and reduced the husband's pension share from 48.6% to 34%. The wife had retained 73% of the non-pension assets plus the balance of her pensions. Both the district judge and the judge had considered that a significant departure from an equal sharing of the matrimonial assets was justified. Following receipt of the judge's judgment both the husband and the wife had sent what were said to be requests for clarification. The judge concluded that these requests were in fact an impermissible "critique of the judgment and an attempt at further argument". In Moylan LJ's view, the judge had clearly decided that it was too late for further evidence to be adduced, and this decision was one which had been open to him and it had not been shown to be wrong. Parties should not expect a judge to permit further evidence to be adduced at such a late stage of the proceedings, particularly following an appeal. Lewison and Nugee LJ agreed, and the wife's appeal was dismissed. Judgment, 01/02/2021, free
  • A short judgment dealing with an ancillary dispute. After a final order had been approved, a question remained as to what security should be provided by the husband. The parties had failed to agree the terms of the security. Lieven J identified disputes as to (a) whether the security should be discharged when the lump sum against which it was charged was paid; (b) the precise terms of the charges; and (c) the particular properties to be charged. She decided that once the lump sum in question had been paid the security in respect of that lump sum would be discharged. The properties to form the security would be as set out in the consent order. She approved the charge drawn in the form drafted by the husband, with his amendments being applied but not the wife's. In her view, the issues around security had spiralled entirely out of control, but she made no order for costs, it not being possible to tell on the material before her where any unreasonable conduct lay. Judgment, 08/10/2020, free
  • The husband appealed from a financial remedy order made in February 2020, on the ground that the judge had failed to assess or take into account the husband's needs and only considered the wife's needs. Part of the order had been for the husband to sell a property in Miami, with the wife to receive the lump sum. The day before the hearing the court – and the husband's own solicitors – learned that the husband's beneficial interest in that property had been transferred to his mother. In Moylan LJ's view, the judge had been entitled to take the husband's litigation conduct into account. The disparity in outcome could be justified in this case. The judge had found that the burden of maintaining the children was likely to be met by the wife. Moylan LJ did not accept the submission that the judge's consideration of the husband's needs had been inadequate. Patten LJ and Newey LJ agreed. The appeal was dismissed. Judgment, 25/09/2020, free
  • The wife made an application to implement the terms of a consent order. The husband cross-applied, to have the order implemented in a different manner. The premise of the consent order had been that two valuable properties in London and New York constituted matrimonial property, and their value would be aggregated with a third property, the overall value being divided equally between the parties. In Mostyn J's judgment, the true facts on which he had made the consent order had not been known by either the parties or the court at the time the order was made, and had the true facts been known (regarding the trusts involved, which were not capable of being collapsed or dissolved) he would have made a materially different order. The order was set aside. Judgment, 09/09/2020, free

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