Family Law Hub

Livesey v Jenkins [1984] UKHL 3

Judgment, published: 13/12/1984

Items referring to this

  • Wife's appeal, out of time, against a consent order made in 2010 after she realised that a trust that she believed had been set up to benefit the children in fact had the husband as the primary beneficiary. The judge ruled that there had been material non-disclosure and the wife had not delayed once the information had come to light. The order was set aside. Judgment, 27/07/2015, free
  • Ex-wife's argument that the ex-husband's claim for financial provision 24 years after their divorce should be struck out as an abuse of process was rejected. Judgment, 11/05/2018, free
  • Judgment concerning whether the court had power to order indemnities relating to two mortgaged properties. Judgment, 28/09/2017, free
  • Judgment from the President concerning whether it was open for a wife to apply to set aside an order for reasons of non-disclosure or whether she was required to appeal as per FPR PD30A. He concludes that the relevant part of PD30A is ultra vires so the wife can proceed without court permission. Judgment, 17/04/2015, free
  • Judgment, 01/10/2009, free
  • Rehearing of a high value financial remedy case, the previous final order of 1st June 2010 having been set aside in July 2015 because of the husband's non-disclosure in respect of his interest in two trusts. Judgment, 25/11/2016, free
  • Financial remedy proceedings had concluded in 2004 with the wife agreeing to a clean break despite her suspicions that the husband had not made a full disclosure of his assets. In 2007 the husband was found guilty of money laundering on a huge scale and was sentenced to 10 years in prison. During the criminal trial the wife learnt that non-disclosure had indeed occurred and applied to have the 2004 order set aside. Mr Justice Moylan, at first instance, did set aside one paragraph of the order, saying that he was satisfied that the husband had failed to give full and frank disclosure of his true financial circumstances during the course of the substantive ancillary relief proceedings, and that his failure was of sufficient materiality to justify granting the wife's application for a rehearing of her claim for financial relief. He was also satisfied that the principles of Ladd v Marshall were established in this case. The husband appealed on the bases that included: 1) A judge at first instance has no jurisdiction to set aside an order granting substantive financial relief made by another judge of equivalent status at first instance; 2) In any event, the judge, sitting at first instance, had no jurisdiction to proceed (as he purported to do) on the basis of the principles set out in Ladd v Marshall (which authority sets out principles upon which an appellate court may admit fresh evidence); 3) If the judge did have jurisdiction to set aside the original order on the basis of material non-disclosure, he could only properly exercise that jurisdiction once it had been proved that material non-disclosure had occurred. The appeal was allowed. Judgment, 13/03/2014, free
  • Case where financial remedy proceedings had concluded in 2004 with the wife agreeing to a clean break despite her suspicions that the husband had not made a full disclosure of his assets. Case note, 28/04/2014, free
  • Wife believed that the husband had not provided full and frank disclosure of his financial circumstances but compromised her claims in a consent order despite this in order to achieve finality. Consent order was set aside by Moylan J because of material non-disclosure. This decision was reversed by the Court of Appeal on grounds of the inadmissibility of the evidence on which he had relied. The Supreme Court allowed the wife's appeal, saying that even if he had referred only to the evidence admissible before him, Moylan J would still properly have found the husband to have been guilty of material non-disclosure; that his order should therefore be reinstated; and that the wife’s claim for further capital provision should therefore proceed before him. Judgment, 14/10/2015, free
  • Appeal against committal orders in relation to breach of an undertaking and 2 other orders after the court found that the husband had not disclosed certain documents in this long running financial provision case. The appeals were dismissed apart from the one in relation to the breach of the undertaking. Judgment, 11/05/2018, free
  • Hughmans, the solicitors firm acting for the respondent wife in financial provision proceedings, was claiming for unpaid fees. The wife was counterclaiming for professional negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, wasted costs and compensation. Judgment, 01/04/2015, members only
  • Judgment, 23/06/2008, free
  • Final hearing of wife's financial remedies claim where the husband had failed to disclose assets in the Cayman Islands. Judgment, 20/11/2017, free
  • Judgment, 19/12/2008, free
  • Judgment, 02/05/2006, free
  • Case note, 03/06/2014, members only
  • Judgment, 28/03/2014, free
  • Appeal against setting aside of order transferring properties to the wife that were legally owned by the former husband's companies. Appeal allowed. Judgment, 12/06/2013, free
  • Appeal against a decision refusing to set aside a Consent Order made in financial remedy proceedings following the dissolution of the appellant's civil partnership with her partner who has since died. The basis of the application to set aside the consent order (which was made after the death of the respondent) was that the deceased had been guilty of material non-disclosure in the financial remedy proceedings. The judge dismissed the appellant's application, which he regarded as being "without merit", and "doomed to failure", saying that allowing the case to proceed would be contrary to the court's overriding objective and his (the judge's) duty actively to case manage an application. The appeal was allowed and the case was remitted for directions before a High Court judge. Judgment, 17/10/2016, free
  • Judgment, 20/02/2002, free
  • A big money case involving a wife's application for an order that the financial remedy hearing that had concluded last year be resumed on the grounds of material non-disclosure by the husband. Judgment, 02/05/2013, free
  • W's appeal against a ruling that, despite a deliberate failure by the H to give full and frank disclosure, any order which would have been made if proper disclosure had taken place would not have been substantially different from the heads of agreement incorporated into the draft, unsealed order which was approved. Accordingly, notwithstanding that the husband was guilty of non-disclosure, the non-disclosure was not material and it followed that the wife's application was dismissed. The appeal was dismissed by a majority, Lord Justice Moore-Bick saying that "It may be unusual for a judge to conclude that despite a deliberate failure by one party to give full and frank disclosure the resulting order should not be set aside, but ultimately that must depend on the nature of the non-disclosure and its effect on the outcome of the proceedings. In this case the husband's non-disclosure was deliberate and dishonest, but because of the rather unusual circumstances there were good reasons for concluding that it had not resulted in an order significantly different from that which the court would otherwise have made at the conclusion of the proceedings. In my view the judge was entitled to hold that the wife had not made out sufficient grounds for re-opening the hearing. That called for an exercise of judgment on his part and in my view his decision was one that was open to him." Judgment, 10/02/2014, free
  • W's appeal against a ruling that, despite a deliberate failure by the H to give full and frank disclosure, any order which would have been made if proper disclosure had taken place would not have been substantially different from the heads of agreement incorporated into the draft, unsealed order which was approved. Case note, 11/03/2014, free
  • Consent order drawn up, after which the wife discovered that the value of the shares in question were far in excess of the figure prepared for the hearing. Court of Appeal dismissed the wife's appeal against a refusal by the judge to set aside the order. Wife's appeal allowed after the Supreme Court held that the High Court judge would not have made the order he did, when he did, in the absence of husband's fraud, and the consent order should have been set aside. He had also been wrong to deprive the wife of a full and fair hearing of her claims by re-making his decision at the hearing of the application on the basis of the evidence then before him. Judgment, 14/10/2015, free
  • Judgment, 10/10/2007, free
  • Application by the ex wife for financial remedy 20 years after a maintenance agreement was made but never concluded by an order of the court Judgment, 15/04/2013, free
  • Judgment, 29/07/2010, free
  • Judgment, 06/06/2012, free
  • In brief: Following the making of an order returning the child to Spain from England, the mother’s (“M”) mental health rapidly deteriorated. She successfully applied to the High Court to have the order set aside and a re-hearing listed following a psychiatric assessment. The Court of Appeal upheld the set aside, concluding that the High Court has the power under the inherent jurisdiction to review and set aside 1980 Hague Convention final orders. The power can be used where there has been a fundamental change of circumstances which undermines the basis on which the original order was made. Here the original return order had been made where the court found that M had not made out her Article 13(b) defence which included M’s claims that there were grave risks to her mental health. Judgment, 16/08/2018, free
  • Judgment, 18/06/2007, members only

Published: 13/12/1984


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